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The author presents lhe results of an exlen~ive literature review and survey analysis 
conducted to identify, compare, and contrast various C4 J evaluation techniques, and 
existing C'J measures of effectiveness (l\lOEs). Evaluation methodologies examined 
include the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analys i~ , the Modular Command and 
Control Evaluation System (MCES), the Mission Oriented Approach (MOA), the 
Headquarters Evaluation Analysis Tool, Evolutionary Upgrade Paths, and Functional 
Decomposition methods. Existing r'>,·fOEs from pa.~t military C'I analyses and academia are 
identified , as well as potential methodologies for developing new MOEs, such as :vICES 
and MOA A new structural framework is developed using Marine Corps doctrine in order 
to categorize MOEs with potential applicabil ity to Marine Corps CI sy~tem analyses. The 
framework is used to compare and contrast identified MOEs, including performance 
ranking based on expert opinion. Conclusions discuss tbe utility of different evaluation 
techniques and estimated performance of identified MOEs Additionally, suggestions for 
higher resolution sub-categories are presented 
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EXECUTIVE SllMMARY 
The ongoing technical revolution spawner.! by increasingly powerful and inex:pcnsive 
information technology has given risc to what has been described as a "revolution in 
military affairs" This revolution, coupled with jointness isslles and decreasing service 
budgets has provided an impetus to usc emerging technolob'Y as a force multiplier on 
future battldielrls 
The military is seeking to exploit technology in order to provide integrated, 
interoperable systems that meet the command and control requirements of services with 
inherently different missions_ Command fimctions, and the flow of infonnation on the 
battlefield falls within the realm of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence (C'I) Increasing demand for imagery, access to national intelligence 
databases, sensor management, and wide area networks are just a few of the challenges 
facing the services in general, and the Marine Corps specifically. Past shortcomings in C'I 
system procurement, however, coupled with the high cost of emerging technologies, have 
made upgrades to current COr systems and new COr acquisitions the subject of intense 
analysis 
This paper presents the results of an ex:tensive literature review and survey anaJysis 
conducted to identify, compare, and contrast various C4} evaluation lechniques, and 
ex:isting C'I measures of effectiveness (MOEs). Existing MOEs from past military 
analyses and academia are identified, as well as potential methodologies for developing 
new MOEs A structural framework is developed using Marine Corps doctrine in order to 
" 
categorize MOEs with potential applicability to Marine Corps CI system analyses. The 
framework is used to compare and contrast identified MOEs, including performance 
ranking based on expert opinion 
A multitude of C r evaluation methodologies exist, each approaching the 
problem of comparative analysis in a slightly different manner_ Available techniques 
include the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), the Modular Command 
and Control Evaluation System (MCES), the Mission Oriented Approach (MOA), the 
Headquarters Effectiveness Analysis 1'001 (HEAT), evolutionary upgrade paths, and 
functional decomposition methods 
The COEA is well established as the tool of choice for Marine Corps C41 system 
comparative analyses during the concept exploration phase of the acq uisition process 
The COEA framework, however, is broad enough to accept input from other, potentially 
more precise, evaluation techniques_ The strength of the MCES lies in its initial focus on 
problem defmition and the environment, rather than a premature focus on a quantitative 
model. MCES also enjoys a commonality of terms and structure which simplify its 
application_ The MOA focuses on obtaining required input from political and military 
decisionmakers prior to defming an analytical question_ HEAT has been successfully 
applied to mi litary c'1 systems, and represents a systematic methodology using 
pre-defmed measures. Evolutionary upgrade path concepts help provide grealer 
resolution when comparing alternate systems with similar capabilities Functional 
decompositions use varied approaches which couch an analysis in terms of required 
system capabilities Although any hybrid combination of methodologies would only be 
developed in the context of the analysis at hand, om: such combination that suggests itself 
might be a COEA which employs the first four modules ofMCES for problem definition, 
and evolutionary upgrade paths for distinguishing the best ora suliset of "good" systems 
The identification of realistic MOEs is a common thread which binds the various 
ell evaluation methodologies. Unique MOEs may be required for a specific analysis, and 
can be generated \Ising :'viC ES, MOA, evolutionary upgrade paths, or functional 
decompositions. Importantly, many useful MOEs aln.-ady exist from past analyses, CI 
literature, and academia The ACCES, for instance. uses a pre-defined set of measures 
which remain constant from analysis to analysis rhe proposed framework for 
categorizing MOEs in Chapter 1II, based on relevant doctrine, providcs a tool for 
identifying and maintaining those MOEs with broad applicability 10 Marine Corps C"I 
systcm cvaluation. Thc framework can changc dynamically with emerging doctrine, and 
can also incorporate new MO Es devdopcd by the application of MCES or other MOE 
generating methodologies 
Importantly, the framework provides a starting point for increased resolution in 
categorizing C"I MOEs for use in Marine Corps related analysis. Potential sub-categories 
that may provide grea\t:r detail include functionality (i.c., Is a component primarily for C1, 
communications, intelligence, or interoperability?), and compatibility (i,e., Is the system 





The technological revolution spawned by the jncrea~ingly powerful and inexpen~ive 
micro-chip has given rise to what many call the "information age." Just as personal 
computers have transformed the commercial and private sectors, the marriage of 
computers and increasingly capable tran~mission ~ystems. including satellite~ and 
microwave, have had a dramatic impact on the American military_ Coupled wilh sweeping 
changes in technological capabilit ies are transformations caused by the cessation of the 
Cold War 
Faced with ever decreasing budgets and end strength, the Army, Navy and Air Force 
arc redefming service missions that once focused extensively on the former Soviet Union; 
the Marine Corps has enjoyed greater stability, since that service had only a limited role in 
the plan to defend Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, the issue of joint ness has 
become dominant, meaning all programs, especially those dealing with information flow, 
are measured by their potential impact on the battlefield interaction of different services 
Traditionally, the flow of information on the battlefield has been called "command and 
control," or Cl For the purposes of this paper, command is a function of authority and 
responsibility assigned to an individual, while control is the means by which the 
commander exercises command_ Taken together C' may be defined as the exercise of 
authority over designated forces in the accomplishment of a mission_ C2 has been 
described as the most important activity in war, although C' " .... ill not make a single attack 
against an enemy force, destroy a single target, or effect a single emergency resupply, . , 
without C, campaigns, battles and organized engagements are impossible," [Ref. I]. As 
will be defined later, several terms exist to describe the equipment and procedures used for 
command and control, which will initially be described as command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C"J) systems The Department of Defense 
currently has in use, or under development, a multitude ofC41 systems, all striving to meet 
the requirements implicit in the definition of command and control 
The military is seeking to exploit rapid advances in C'l technology, while 
simultaneously working for integrated, interoperable systems that meet the command and 
control requirements of inherently different service missions, 000 Direction, as stated in 
the Corporate Infonnation Management initiative and "C41 for the Warrior" [Ref. 21 has 
outlined the need for more use of Conunercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items and looser 
business-driven standards [Ref. 3] Increasing demand for imagery, access to national 
intelligence databases, sensor management, and wide area networks are just a few of the 
challenges facing the services in general, and the Marine Corps specifically 
In the Marine Corps, current systems vary greatly in age and capability. New systems 
often represent quantum leaps in capability due to the age of the systems they replace, 
although the "new" system often represents less then cutting edge technology due to the 
length of the acquisition process. The new Single Channel Ground-Air Radio System 
(SINCGARS), which is 1980's technology, is currently being fielded to Fleet Marine Force 
units to replace a family of radios representing 1950's technology, which was I !~-elffie\ded 
in thc 1900's. Additionally, most of the Cr systems currently in use were constructed as 
stand-alone systems designed to meet requirements at specific echelons of command or 
within certain warfighting areas (e.g. , air defense). Such design has hindered attempts to 
modernize existing C4 1 systems, since seamless connectivity between echelons, warfighting 
areas, and services is necessary For example, the digital "backbone" of today's Marine 
Corps employs approximately nine different pieces of conullunications equipment, and 
extends downward only to the regimental level [Ref 4 J Even those newer equipments 
fielded for the joint arena are not immune to connectivity problems; the Tri-Service 
Tactical (Tri-Tac) Unit Level Circuit Switch (ULCS), an Air Force program jointly 
endorsed by the Army and Marines, has been purchased in quantity only by the Marine 
Corps. causing significant interoperability problems between Marine, Army and Air I'orce 
field headquarters [Ref. 5] 
The effort to manage the controlled flow of huge quantities of information over vast 
distances. to increasingly smaller units, has resulted in tremendous challenges to the 
Marine Corps research and development (R&D) community. Due to the rapid changes in 
technology, and the large dollar amounts involved, upgrades to current systems and new 
system acquisitions aTe the focus of intense analysis_ While analysis techniques vary, the 
requirement to identify appropriate measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is fundamental to 
each. An effe(;tive MOE provides the necessary framework to move an analysis from a 
qualitative to a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness ofa CI .~ystem . Although the 
definit ion will be expanded further, an MOE will initially be defined as a quantity that 
results from the comparison of various measures ofa systems performance to the mission 
requirements [Ref 6]. If MOEs are found which can be applied across systems, 
comparisons between systems may be facilitated . Ultimately, the difficulties encountered 
by some C'I systems during concept development, acquisition, or fielding may be the 
direct result of less than robust MOEs 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A wide variety of methodologies have been developed to evaluate CI systems, 
including the modular command and control structure (MCES), the mission ori , ;"!ted 
approach (MOA), the cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA), and 
evolutionary upgrade paths. A common thread which binds these and other approaches is 
the fundamental requirement to identify robust, realistic, MOEs. This thesis identifies, 
documents, compares, and contrasts techniques for developing C4I MOEs, and identifies 
and examines existing MOEs, especially those with recurring use, that may be broadly 
applicable to existing Marine Corps C4 I programs. The usefulness. definition, and 
rdtionale for each of the MOEs are presented, as well as the procedures for their 
calculation 
C. APPROACH AND SCOPE 
A comprehensive literature search has been conducted in order to fully document 
existing methodologies for comparing e'l systems, focusing on techniques for developing 
C"I MOEs Frequently used MOEs are identified, as well as MOEs which may have 
applicability across different e'l ~ystems. The nature of the MOEs identified, as well a~ 
the procedures for their calculation, and the feasibility of the measure with regard to cost 
and time, are compared with other measures to determine contrasts. The study of MOEs 
focuses on those that may prove useful to the Marine Corps 
D. OVERVIE\V OF REMAlNL"<JG CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter n, Literature Review 
This chapter presents a current overview of the large body of!iterature dealing with 
e 'l effectiveness measures. Key tenns are defined, and a standard set of terminology is 
established Each of the techniques for evaluating C'I systems is looked at in overview in 
order to provide a framework of how MOEs. once established, are employed. The 
techniques for MOE development inherent in each evaluation methodology are then 
presented, followed by a discussion of the general nature of the MOEs resulting from 
each 
2, Chapter W. Analysis of Measures 
This chapter establishes a structural framework in which to place Marine Corps C' 
MOEs The framework is derived from Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3 
"Conunand and Control," and is inclusive of current Marine Corps Cl doctrine. Next, 
pertinent C' MOEs from the literature and past analyses are positioned inside the doctrinal 
framework , which consists of tive category "bins," in order to facilitate analysis of the 
Expert opinion is garnered to rank the MOEs on an interval scale within 
categories, according to the criteria of performance Finally, in conjunction with 
Appendix A, a discussion of MOEs by category is presented, defining their individual 
characteristics, completeness, scalability, and underlying measures Utilizing the 
underlying measures, the procedures for collecting measurable data and computational 
requirements are discussed 
3. Chapter IV. Conclusions 
This chapter presents a summary of c'r evaluation methodologies and techniques for 
generating Cr MOEs. The strengths of each evaluation method are reviewed, as well as 
potential hybrid combinations of methodologies_ Finally, an overview of the doctrinal 
categorical framework is presented, along with suggestions for resolution enhancements to 
the existing categories 
n. LITERATURE REV LEW 
A. DEFINITIONS 
l. WhyeI? 
The continuing rapid rate of change in electronics and communications technologies 
has resulted in a serious lack of unifonnity regarding tenninology associated with 
command and control. Different military services, and indeed branches within services, 
lack agreement in the definitional framewo rk of C2 [Ref 7]. In the years fonow ing World 
War It the familiar term command and control was expanded to include communications, 
becoming e'. Intelligence was added to create the e'I definition, which was standard for 
almost thirty years [Ref 8] This paper will use the term command, control, 
conununications, computers and intelligence (C 4I), which reflects current usage in the 
Marine Corps (e.g., Assistant Chief of Staff, C4 I), and which participants of the 1993 
Command and Control Concept Development Game agreed should become standard for 
the naval service, in order "to avoid unnecessary confusion among ourselves and with 
olher services and remove any differences between the naval service's approach to C~I and 
the Join! Staffs" [Ref 8J 
The hreadth of the C1 domain, however, continues to give rise to a multitude of 
similar terms. The increased reliance on large intelligence databases and scrvice 
interoperability requirements has given rise to "command, control, communications, 
computers intelligence and interoperabili ty (C'll)," and the electronic warfare community 
frequently adds EW to the above terms, as illustrated by the J 992 Military Operations 
Research Socicty (MORS) elIEW Measures uf Effectiveness Conference 
A starting point for the definition of command and cuntrol was defined in Chapter I 
as the exercise uf authority over designated forces in the accomplishment of a mission 
More specifically, Joint Chiejs oj Slaff Publication I (JCS Pub I) defincs Command and 
Control as 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission 
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures wllich are 
employed by a commander in planning, directing coordinating, and controlling 
forces and operations in the accomplishment of this mission, 
Thus command and control is by definition composed of three major clements 
personnel, equipment, and procedures. In keeping with the intent of past MORS, NPS, 
and MJTRE workshops dealing with the subject ofC analysis, C1 should be taken to mean 
as broad a concept as possible, avoiding any distinction between, for example, "command 
and control" and "combat direction." lRef 7J Since this paper deals with the identification 
of MOEs to aid in the quantifiable analysis of Cr "systems," the concept of a (4! system 
must be defined 
Again turning to JCS Pub I, a C1 system is defined as "the facilities, equipment, 
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning. 
directing, and eontro11ing operatiuns.· The Marine Corps has described a C4 r system as 
"the integration of communications, computers and intelligence technologies and 
procedures into a func tional, cohesive system designed to suppon the commander COl 
is distinct from C1 in that ('I is the enabler for C,-" [Ref 8J Although emerging Marine 
Corps doctrine seems to define the components of a C' system as people, information, and 
C1 suppon strul:tuTC, for purposes of this paper a C l system will be viewed as having as 
its three components: physical entities, stnlctures, and processes [Ref IJ_ Again using 
definitions from MORS workshops and the MCES system, a CI system incorporates the 
three elements of the JCS Pub I definition in the following malUler 
a. Phy.~icQI Entitie.f 
Physical entities refers to the equipment, software, facilities, and manpower of a 
CI system_ Manpower, or people, "drive the command and control system - they make 
things happen - and the rest of the system exists only to serve them." [Rcf IJ In other 
words, humans are integral components of the CI system, nO! merely users [Ref IJ 
Facilities reft:T to "the command posts and other spaces where command and control is 
sometimes performed," while equipment includes "the communications and other gear 
which suppon corrunand and control, from pyrotechnics to computers" [Ref. I] 
b. Structures 
Structures of a C"I system identifY the arrangement and interrelationships of 
physical entities, procedures, protocols, concepts of operation, and information patterns 
[Ref 9]. Such arrangements can be both spatial and temporal. Procedurt:s include the 
"techniques by which we perfonn various corrunand and control functions," and they apply 
only to "role or mechanical tasks, not to acts of judgement" [Ref I) Organization 
"provides those groups of people through which the commander exercises command 
and establishes the channels by which information flows." [Ref I] 
c. Pr()cesse~' 
A process is a description of what thc system is actually doing. and reflects the 
functions carried out by the system [Ref I]. Thesc activities "include - but are not limited 
to - gathering and analyzing information, making decisions, organizing resources, 
planning. communicating instructions and other information, coordinating, monitoring 
results, and supervising execution." [Ref 1] Note that processes are not the same as 
procedures. Both processes and functions are defined in detail in the Marine Corps 
Mi.uioll Area Allalysis oj Missirm Area 1 J - Command and Control. 
2. Measures 
Within the realm of c'r system evaluation, the set of terms that has been developed 
by the analytic community seems 10 enjoy a more uniform acceptance than the previous 
terms dealing with the broader descriptions of Cl . Measures of C'f systems cover a 
spectrum of specific system aspects. The phrase "measures of meritH (MOM) has been 
used to describe the overall collection of measures, which will be categorized according to 
four groups: measures of force effectiveness (MOFEs), measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs), and physical (sometimes called dimensional) 





C4I MOE C41 MOE 
I /\ 
MOP J MOP 1 MOP 2 
/\ I I 
Ph)sicaJ Parameter Phy~ical Paramelcr Physical Parameter Ph)"sical ParamClcr 
Figure I. Hierarchical Relationship of Measures of Merit. From Ref [9] . 
MOMs, as listed, are categorized by their relationship to the boundaries of a C'I 
system. In tum, the boundary is defined by the scope of the analysis being conducted, and 
represents the delineation between the system being studied and the environment. 
Therefore the definit ions of the four categories of measures, while rigorous, can only be 
applied in their relationship to the system boundary. Figure 2 depicts the relationship 
between different boundaries and the environment, in what is called the "onion skin-
diagram. Thus a thorough understanding of the boundaries for any system mu~1 be 
accomplished within the context of the analysis at hand. Depending on the resolution of 
11 
the analysis, what might be used as an MOP (for a national level system), could be used 
in another analysis as an MOE (for a serv1ct': It':vel system). [Ref 7] 
Where 
D = Dimtnsion 
P = Performance 
E = Effectiveness 
F '" Force Outcome 
Environment 
Figure 2. Oniun Skin Diagram. From Ref. Pl. 
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Besides category and system reference (or boundary) attributes, all MOMs have the 
additional attributes of names, function reference (or purpose), units of measure, value 
measured, and threshold value (or goal) fRcf. 91 
II. Phy.~ical Parameler.{ 
A physical parameter describes the tangible, physical aspects of a component or 
system Its value determines system behavior and the structure under question even when 
at rest [Ref 7J Examples of physical parameters include size, weight, capacity, and 
number of pixels 
h. Mea.~ures of Performance 
An MOP is closely related to a physical parameter, in that it represents a 
property or characteristic inherent in the physical entity [Ref 9]. Stated in another way, it 
measures attributes of systems behavior, or "performance is a measure of the ability to 
take action in accordance with requirements in the exccution of an action." L Ref 6] 
Examples include baud rate, throughput, and frequency range MOPs are internal to the 
system being analyzed, and are scenario independent [Ref 9} 
MOPs have also been defined as non-probablistic meuures of performance, 
where "the MOP class provides for the collection of metrics .. that are not probabilities 
of successful outcomes of functions." [Ref. 10J Thus MOPs are the ~consequenceK of 
specific configurations of physical elements_ The probabilistic nature of this definition of 
MOP:; also leads to an alternate definit ion ofMOEs 
13 
c. Measures of Effectiveness 
An MOE is a measure of how the C41 system performs its functions, or affects 
other entities, within an operational environment [Ref 9] e'l MOE are measured 
relative to some standard, which is often simply the implicit baseline of Hhow would a 
perfect CI system perform." [Ref. 9] Additionally, CJ MOE are scenario dependent 
Some examples include probability of detection and target dekction; Chapter JIJ will 
provide many more examples in the form of C", MOEs with potential applicability to 
Marine Corps systems 
By couching the definition in probabilistic temls, Girard [Ref. 10] and Elele fRef 
6] havc developcd more mathematically rigorous ddi.nitions for MOEs. In Girard's tenns, 
an MOE is the probability of the successful accomplishment of a function, where all 
probabilities are conditional, and are derived from MOPs and lower level (or prior) MOEs, 
and where a function is a process relating in an outcome {Ref. 10]. Thus "an MOE 
defined by an objective function at an uppcr level is a dependent variable, and is a 
mathematical funct ion of the MOEs defined by objective functions at a lower level.- [Ref. 
10] Ultimately, an "audit trail" equation is generated, linking the conditional upper level 
~OE to measurable MOPs Elele uses Bayes' Rule to develop a similar probability based 
MOE definition LRef. 6] 
At an even higher level of abstraction, Levis and Cothier [Ref. II], Levis {Re( 
12}, and Levis and Martin fRcf. 131 have developed an MOE methodology based on set 
theory. Similarly, Dockery LRef. 14J explores fuzzy set thcory in dcfining MOEs 
14 
d Afeasures oJ Force Effect;vene.\·.~ 
An !l.10FE is a measure of how the force performs its missions, 
"contrihution to battk outcome" [Ref. 71 Again, MOFEs are inherently scenario 
dependent, since Ihey are tied to operational context and assumed enemy actions 
B. C'I SYSTEM EVALUATION TECllNIQUES 
1. Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) 
The !l.10Es and doctrinal framework presented later in chapter III will be developed 
primarily for use with the cost and operational efrectiveness analysis. A COEA is a 
systematic study "designed to assist a decision maker in identifying a preferred choice 
among possible altematives." [Ref. IS] COEAs are currently the tool of choice for the 
evaluation of alternative sy~lems during the concept development phase of acquisition 
The fir~t step in a COEA involves defining the overall objectives of the study, 
identifying a "base case" system (usually consisting of currently fielded assets), and a set of 
alternative systems to be evaluated The evaluation itself usually focuses on three areas: 
effectiveness, cost, and risk, of which effectiveness requires the development of MOEs 
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Perfonn r Sensitivity 
Analysis 
-Yarylnputs 
FIgure). Cost And OperatIonal Effectiveness AnalysIs. From Ref. [15J . 
2. Modular Command and Control Evaluation System (MCES) 
The modular command and control evaluation system was developed by a learn of 
experts from industry, government and academia, in a series of forums initiated by the 
MITRE Corporation and the Military Operations Research Society, and hosted by the 
Naval Postgraduate Schoul during the 1980s. The purpose of the forums was to develop 
a general approach to analyzing C' systems, and the result of their efforts is a seven 
module system thaI has been successfully applied to many facets of C1, including planning, 
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aC'luisition, testing and operation [Ref. 16]. The strength oflhe MCES approach lies in 
the guidance it provides to analysts who might otherwise focus prematurely on the 
quantitative model, rather than the problem definition and the specific measures needed to 
discriminate between alternatives [Ref 16] . The MCES presents a method to attack 
dillicu lt concepts in a standardized manner, using some semblance of standardized 
tcnninoiogy and paradigms_ Ultimately the MCES can be thought of as two processes, a 
managerial system which serves as a guide to specifying the problem to be analyzed, and 
an analytic system which serves as a guide to the analysis process itself {Ref. 17] The 
seven modules are described ind ividually bdow 
The first modulI:. problem formulation, identifies the objective of an application, 
!~ading to a precise statement of the problem being addressed. The system's operational 
and deployment concepts, environmental factors, scenarios, assumptions and threats are 
made explicit. rRef 17] 
Module two, ;;y.',fem bounding, takes the output of the first module (the problem 
statement), and uses it to bound the system. The system bounds are defined in terms of 
the thre~ categories of a CI system (defined earlier in the chapter as physical entities, 
structures, and processes), and the onion skin diagram. The implementation of this 
module results in the identification and categorization ofthe system elements. [Ref 17] 
M.odule three, process definition, involves building a dynamic framework that 
identifies the relevant C' processes, each broken down into a st:! of functions The 
framework focuses attention on the environmental forct'S wbicb initiate the C' process, th~ 
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internal C' process functions which detail what the system is doing, and the required input 
to and output from the internal C' process The implementation of this module results in 
the identification of the functions of the C' process, which are mapped into a C' process 
loop. The generic C1 process loop consists of an environmental stimulus, which initiates a 
process of: sense, assess (with regard to desired state), generate, select, plan, and direct, 
the result of which is a system response to one's own fo rces, inside the context of the 
environment. [Ref. 17] 
The fourth module of the process, if/legration oj system elements af/d junctions, 
integrates the system elements identified in module two, and the process functions from 
module three, into a representation of the C'l system. The product of this module is at 
least a complete descriptive conceptual model, and perhaps a complete mathematical 
modeL rRef. 17] 
Using the four prior modules as a base, the fifth module, specijicalion oj meaSllre~;, 
specifically idenlifies the MOPs, MOEs, and MOFEs necessary 10 address the problem of 
interest. The measures are specific with regard to the corresponding levels of the C' I 
system and C'J funct ions Resulting measures must adhere 10 a sct of desired 
characteristics, which often includes whether the measure is mission-oriented, 
discriminatory, measurable, objective, sensitive, and inclusive [Ref. 171. Note that the 
MCES can be utilized just for the implementation of the first five modules, which will 
result in a concise problem statement, a complete description of the C' I system, including 
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its functions, and a list of acceptable measures The sd ofmt:asures can then be applied in 
the form of another C' evaluation methodology, such as a COEA. 
Module six, data genera/ioll, involves the generation of data for the measures 
identified in the previous module. Any appropriate type of data generator may be used, 
including simulation, exercises, experiments, or expert opinion [Ref 17J The module 
output is simply the values associated with the measures ofinteresl 
The final module, aggregation oj measures, aggregates and interprets the observed 
values of the meaSures. The analysis results are tailored to address the problem statement 
of module one. The seven MCES modules are perfonm:d iteratively, with the decision 




Figure 4 MCES Structurc. From Rcf. [17] 
20 
3. l\lission Oricnted Approach 
rhe mission oriented approach is a four phase framework for formulating 
requirements while maintaining an optimal halanee between operational req ui rements, 
technical capabjlitje~, and scarce resources (sec Figure 5) [Ref. 1111 The MOA 
"systematically relates mission objectives and operational plans to [l system ohjectives 
and associated programs" [Ref IS] The approach is somewhat similar to the MCES, in 
that thc fi rst two phases of MOA relate to the functional definition module ofMCES, and 
the last two phases of MOA deal with thc C' capabilities in MCES module four. Like the 
MCES, the MOA is beneficial as a potentially conunon framework for discussio ns among 
communities, although it lacks the commonalty of terms built into MCES. Finally, while 
the MOA is well suited for requirements definit ion, it is not particularly well suited for 
evaluation ofaltemative C'I systems [Ref 19] 
The first phase begins by addressing the question "What are we trying to achieve 
operationally?" Tbis question is directed well above the operator and analyst level, to the 
relevant political and military decision makers_ The response to this question is generally 
framed in terms of a set of strategic capability objectives for employing forces . These 
force capability objectives become the standard against which the capabilities of eJciSling, 
and proposed, "packages" ofC' systems can be measured . rRef. 18] 
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Figure 5 GenericMOA From Ref. [18] 
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Phase two addresses the related question. "How are we trying to perfonn the 
mission?" This question should be answered by those operational personnel who 
formulate concepts of operation at multiple levels; typical levels of aggregation include 
~tratcgic capability, mission (operational) capabili ty, and functional capability. For each 
level, the capability objectives are "self-consistently derived, beginning with specified 
strategic capabil ity levels, based on perceived adversary operations, friendly concepts of 
operation and envirorunental factors." l Ref 1 &] 
The third phase of the MOA, addresses "what technically" is required to support the 
operation defined in the first two phases. Technical personnel arc employed to "translatc 
the operational/mission/function capability obje(.,~ive levels into the technical attributes of 
the packages of communications" needed to implement the rcspective capability levels 
[Ref I H Technical characteristics are derived using the existing, and proposed, 
characteristics offricndly forces, enemy forces and the environment 
Having defincd "what technically' is required in the third phase, the fourth phase of 
the process dcscribes "how technically" will the desired characteristics be incorporated 
Based on technical deviat ions ohtained by comparing existing packages of C1 systcms to 
the technical objectivcs of phase three, alternative packages of C systems can be 
formulated "consistcnt with assumed restrictions on availablc resources_~ [Ref 18] Thus 
potential "investment strategies" are outlined, which can then be assessed to ddermine 
how well they meet the strategic objectives set forth by policy makers in phase one [Ref 
Illl. Note that by going back to phase one, the MOA becomcs an iterative process, 
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indeed "the key to successful application ofMOA is iteration" [Ref IS] The iteration is 
needed to address issues across communities (e.g., operational and technical), and within 
communities (e.g., systcm operators and maintainers) 
4. Headquarters Effectiveness Analysis Tool 
The headquarters effectiveness evaluation tool, or !-fEAT, is based on adaptive 
control system theory [Ref 20]. Two variants of HEAT arc currcntly in usc, they arc the 
Army command and control evaluation system (ACCES), and a Navy version for battlc 
force in-port training (BriT) [Ref 21]. The primary focus of HEAT is the overall 
perfonnance of a headquarters, and in general HEAT addresses the question "What should 
be done to improve thc effectiveness of a military headquarters?" [Ref. 21] ACCES 
focuses this question primarily on the division headquarters [Ref. 20J. Candidates for 
improvement include the headquarters staff (staff size, organization, training, procedures, 
etc ,), and C4 I systems In execution, HEAT uses specific definitions ofc'I theory, tools 
and applications 
Theory, in the fonn of a decision-making model, aids in the design of measurement 
tools, and suggests hypotheses for experiments and exercises. The decision making model 
is "the most fundamental concept in HEAT theory," [Ref. 21] The model itself is an 
expanded Boyd cycle, and includes the six "process steps" of: monitoring (obtaining data 
from the envirorunent), estimation (placing values on monitoring), situation assessment 
(interpreting estimates), option generation (generates feasible courses af actian), option 
selection, and plan-generation/direction [Ref. 21]. The model "asserts that planning, 
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dccisionmaking. and execution activities conducted by a headquarters arc analogous to a 
feedback control system that attempts to keep its external environment within acceptable 
bounds, despite the actions of the enemy'" [Ref 21J The six process steps transcend 
organizational boundaries, since each step does exist (in some form) in virtually every 
headquarters, making the model a foundation for posing and answering questions ahout 
headquarters effectiveness 
The HEAT measurement 1001 consists of a set of measures that, as a whole, capture 
important determinants of effectiveness_ ACCES in particular, has forty-three MOEs 
designed to detennine command post eifectiveness [Ref 20]. The HEAT measures fall 
into three hroad categories: process, performance, and effectiveness. Process and 
perfonnance measures can be further defined under four types: characteri~tic measures 
(process mcasures that indicate whether a headquarters strives to be optimal), 
coordination measures (process measures that capture the degree of infonnation 
coherence), queueing measures (performance measures that indicate the origins of lime 
delays), and quality measures (performance measures that indicate the degree to which 
performance approaches a norm - usually the accuracy of the headquarters perception of 
ground truth) [Ref 21]. HEAT MOEs that may be pertinent to Marine C'I systems are 
included in Chapter ITI of this paper. 
A HEAT application results in the assignment of values to the HEAT measures, and 
may consist of experiments and/or exercises Note that experiments and exercises are 
complementary, as exercises can help validate experiment findings, or suggest independent 
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variables tor future experiments_ A key aspect of a HEAT application is the requirement 
for ohservation . Towards this end, HEAT observers must 'undergo specialized training, 
which includes fundamental HEAT concepts and the rudimentaries of data collection [Ref 
21J 
Although the IlEAT methodology is well defined, and has been successfully applied 
by analysts, the rel iance on a defined set of MOEs limits this evaluation technique when 
compared to the MCES or the MOA. Additionally, HEAT uses a standardized model, in 
contrast to the fonnal problem and environmental definitions found in the initial modules 
of the MCES . The Army has found that "the most debilitating problem with the ACCES 
methodology is the reliance upon percentage figures .. raw scores would provide a great 
deal more precise and reliable information" [Ref 20] 
5. Evolutionary Upgrade Path~ 
Most existing CI systems, especially recent procurements, will likely be 
incorporated with some type of product improvement or upgrade during their useful life 
cycle. The conccpt of evolutionary upgrade paths is that an effective evaluation of a new 
C4l system must include an evaluation of its planned upgrade path toward some goal or 
target level of functionality . The evolutionary acquisition concept is a "build a little, test a 
little, field a little" approach, using off-the-shelf equipment and software where applicable 
More fonnally, it is "an acquisition strategy which may be used to procure a system 
(which is) expected to evolve during development, within an approved architectural 
framework, to achieve an overall systems capability." fRef. 191 
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Proponents of evulutionary acquisition point [0 several compelling reasons for 
utilizing the approach Past attempts at using the "big system" approach, that is, field ing a 
complete, integrated system all at once, have been somewhat unsuccessful. Examples of 
perceived failures include the many iterations of TeO (starting in 1968), and MIFASS 
[Ref 19J _ Additionally, it is difficult to generate a complete list of defined requirements 
for a needed system; new technology, new procedures, and the length of the acquisition 
process all add to the uncenainly of predicting the tinal system requirements_ Finally, 
proponents argue that user response is more quickly incorporated and capabilities are 
fielded faster lIsing evolutionary acquisition. By starting with a fieldcd system with which 
the user is already fami liar, the user can better assimilate and evaluate changes. Also, by 
quickly fielding a core capability willIe concurrently developing component systems, new 
technology (including commen;ial-off-the-shelf items) (;an reach the user at a rate much 
faster than is currently possible. 
The evolutionary upgrade framework consists of four major steps Step one is to 
define the target system's functions and capabilities, The system capability requirements 
are detailed in the originating mission need statement, and the operational requirements 
documcnt. Similarly, C"I functions are well documented in doctrine, as well as the 
previously mcntioned Marine Corps Mission Area 1\ analysis, although funclional 
decompositions may be required to meet the desired resolution. Once defined, functions 
must be matched to the technological capabilities required to support them. With the 
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relationship between target system capabilities and functions established, weights are 
assigned to the function according to perceived value 
The second step is to define all viable upgrade paths For each potential base 
system, the goal is to establish a list of candidate paths which result in a target system that 
possesses the capabilities established in the original definition of the target system. Base 
~ystems should preferably meet some of the requirements of the target system, and may 
have multiple candidate paths. The underlying concept is that each base system could 
someday meet the total requirements of the target system, by incrementally adding future 
capabilities. Finally, each candidate path should satisfy the current cost, resource, and risk 
constraints 
The third step of the fTamework involves detennining the overall value and cost of 
each candidate path. The values for each function were determined in step one, and by 
summing the values of the functions met while incorporating some "discount" function to 
account for the timeliness with which the base system reaches target system maturity. The 
time series approach to discounting is necessary since, by definition, each candidate path 
ultimately incorporates each of the functions required in the target system, which would 
cause the sum of the function values for each path to be equal. Additionally, the concept 
of "functionally derived values," or attaching greater values to the most important 
technological capabilities, can provide valuable insights into system priorities. [Ref 19] 
The cost of each candidate path can be computed by adding the cost of the 
alternative base system if bought today, and the cost of adding a new capability in the 
future Note that the !.:osts to achieve the target system may differ hetween base systems, 
due to the potential ditferen(;cs in hardware, software, and configurations. Costs should 
be put in constant dollars, and should indude costs associated with research, development, 
test ing, and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, and operations and support costs Like 
vaiues, costs can be "discounted" to account for technological priorities. [Ref 19] 
The final step can be thought of as a linear program, where one is maximizing value, 
subject to cOSI, resource, and risk constraints_ The final selection method would involve 
the elimination of those candidate paths that violated the constraints, and selecting from 
the remaining paths the one with the highest value 
6. Functional Decompositions 
To an extent. some form of functional decomposition is present in most of the 
preceding techniques, such as the detailed user requirements in the COEA, module three 
in the MCES, or "how operationally" in the MOA. Several less used C'I evaluation 
techniques employ variations of functional dt-'Composition as the primary framework for 
their methodology 
Kemple. Stephens, and Crolotle [Ref. 221 usc expert opinion in a three part 
methodology that defines MOEs for CI systems_ First, a three phase "value analysis" is 
conducted where experts define "attributes" of ~stem effectiveness, weight them by 
relative importance, and then reduce them to a reasonably sized set of the most significant 
attributes Next a functional analysis is conducted, using a system functional 
decomposition which is again weighted by experts, in order to facilitate comparisons 
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Finally, the value and functional analyses are combined to generate what should be 
measured. appropriate scenarios, and MOEs defined through linear aggregation [Ref 22] 
Girard [Ref !O]. has developed what he calls "a function based definition of Cl 
MOEs." Using requirements documents, such as the Navy's Top Level Warfare 
Requirement (TLWR), a functional decomposition is conducted in each of three domain~ 
mission, organization, and resource Mission success criteria (MSCs) and required 
capabilities (RCs), both established by the TLWR, are used to generate the init ial tiers of 
functions_ Most mission success criteria and required capabilities can be stated in terms of 
the probability of successfully accomplishing a function, therefore a function defines its 
own metric_ Conver~ely, a probability metric defines the outcome of its related function 
For example, the probability of detection identifies the detection event as the outcome of 
the search function; functions, and their related metrics, become inseparable. [Ref 10] 
RCs can be thought of as a set of subfunctions for the higher level functions defined 
by the MSCs In this way, a procedure (a set of functions carried out in some prescribed 
manner) represents the implementation of the higher order function in lerms of its 
subfunctions A model of the procedure will De nothing more than a conditional 
probability describing the relationship of the lower level melncs to the higher level metries 
In this manner, Girard arrives at his definition of an MOE as the (conditional) probability 
of the successful accomplishment of a function [Ref. 101_ The MOEs resulting from the 
decomposition can then be applied using a variety of analytical tools 
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The C' MOE Handbook issued by the Anny'.'> Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) also uses fum;tional decomposition methodology to describe a method for 
developing MOE.'> As a first step, the methodology lists six components which must be 
defined objectives. functions, processes, tasks, structures, and physical entities, These 
components represent "links" between the C"l system, lhe decisionmaker's questions, and 
the hjerarchy of C' l components A rough outline of the links can help portray 
interrelationships and implications inherenl in the dccisiorunaker's questions The 
questions themselves should be simplified, wi th the goal being "to break those high level 
questions down through a systematic functional decomposition that results in the 
development of issues or questions that are specificaUy worded to obtain data. · [Ref 23] 
Through the functional dccQmpositiun of the deeisionmakcr's questions, issues, sub-issues, 
essential clements of analysis, MOfEs. MOEs MOPs, and data requirements are 
developed which guide and direct the required analytical work The handbook 
recommcnds a logic tree (dendritic network) to portray the interconnectivity of a logical 
network uscd in decomposing the decisionmaker's questions into issues. [Ref 23] 
C. SUMMARY 
Although the COEA is the standard tool employed by the Marine Corps to evaluate 
alternative C41 systems during thc concept definition phase of acquisition, this chapter has 
suggested that there are several equally robust evaluation tools. Significantly, alternate 
evaluation techniques can be complementary to the traditional COEA framework , An 
application of one of the functional decomposition techniques can strengthen the 
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originating requirements documents, the MNS and the ORD. The MCES, with its 
commonalty of terms and robust problem definition. can aid in the identification of 
measures that wil l provide a valid comparison between the alternative systems in the 
COEA Finally, the evolutionary upgrade path framework can add resolution to 
alternative systems that in the current COEA framework might otherwise "be too close to 
call" 
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m. mENTJFICATION A;\ID AI"ALYSIS OF MEASURES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Due to the variety of functions different e'l systems may perfonn, the MOEs to be 
used in an analysis must ollen be devised specifically for the task at hand. Indeed, the 
MCES methodology makes clear that prior to idcntif):ing MOEs, the problem must be 
clearly stated and the environment must be fully defined. As has already been mentioned. 
an MOE alone level might be an MOFE or an MOP at another level 
Many good MOEs, however, aTC already in existence, and there is no requirement to 
be original in identirying MOEs for a particular study. Pertinent MOEs may be gleaned 
from past analyses, studies, and academic submissions to those periodicals that deal with 
command and control (c_g., Signal Magazine and IEEE) . Whcn dealing with the large 
body of existing MOEs, the primary prohlem is determining which arc applicablc and 
valid. Further, the sheer volume of existing MOEs rcquires some sort of framework to 
categorize them; a workable framework allows manageable comparisons to be made 
between potential alternatives Several potential frameworks present themselves for 
consideration, including categorizing by system composition (hardwarc, software, 
communications equipment), system functiom, or ~ystem cost. A system hased 
categoril..ation, however, fails to narrow the set of existing MOEs with regard to Marine 
Corps C'I directivcs. To that end, existing USMC doctrine pertinent to the C'I arena was 
rcviewed in order to gain insight into a rramework with more specific application to the 
Marine Corps. This framework will be summarized in the sections that follow 
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B. nOCTRJIIOAL FRAMEWORK 
Marine Corps doctrine concerning command and control, while voluminous, is also 
very specific in regard to required capabilities and characteristics. FMFM 3, Command 
and Control, provides a structural framework for the classification of C' system ideas, 
requirements, capabilities and characteristics listed in other doctrine, including FMFM 
3-30 Communications, Mission Area Analysis oj Mission Area J J - Command and 
Control, FMFRP 14-30 A Concept oj Command and Control, and the Command and 
COlilrol Concept Filial Report. FMFM 3 is particularly pertinent because it marks "the 
first (Marine Corps) effort to apply conunand and control theory specifically to maneuver 
warfare in doctrinal terms," [Ref. 241 Specifically, the framework suggested by FMFM 3 
consists of five broad categories, which seem to be inclusive of the crucial C', system 
requirements discussed throughout Marine Corps doctrine The doctrinal categories, 
taken directly rrom r-;VFM 3, are as rollows 
I) Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events 
2) Adapt to the Situation 
3) Support Information Requirements 
4) Exploit MAGTF Capabilities 
5) Support CP Effectiveness 
Broader descriptions ofthesc categories arc given in the sections that follow 
In oroer to assess the extcnt to whieh these doctrinal categories encompass aU Marine 
Corps Cr doctrinal requirements, and to describe the dOl."trinal categories in greater detail, 
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additional Marine Corps C"I publications were examined for funher elements of doctrine 
Any statement that defines additional c 4 r performance or capability requirements wa.~ 
listed as an element of doctrine_ Tahle I shows examples of these additional clements of 
doctrine, which tOlal 39 statements from six publications 
Fe' system "places decision making al the lowest possibk level." 
A C' system "ensures subordinate commanders receive idt:as and conl:epts, not jusl data packages" 
IA C' system should "translale the commander's decisions into plans and orders." 
- -
A C' system should "~upef\ise the execution oflhose plans and orders." 
r~ThC MAClTF oonunander must be able to make and implement decisions faSler than the enemy, so as to 
gain Ihe initialive and create tactical advantages for the MAGTF to exploit" 
IA C' S}'stcm ,hould pos>css Ihe "capability for II<1EF and MEB conunand e1cmt;:nts 10 conduci rapid 
IIlJssJOn planrnng al a levd comparable 10 that ofa MEU." 
Table I. Examples of AddItional Elements ofOoctnne 
fhe additional elements of doctrine, hereafter referred to as "supporting elements," 
were placed into the contexl of the five doctrinal categories in order to determine the 
comprehensiveness of the framework . The actual placement of supporting clements into 
the doctrinal categories was based on the author's determination of whether the supporting 
elements reinforced or clarified the description of a panieular eategory_ For example, the 
definition of doctrinal category one, "Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events,N is as 
follows 
No coherent battle plan is possible without the commander's vision of 
how he intends to win_ The C' system, imbued by his intent, provides the 
means to apply his decision effectively, gather and analyze information, 
implement his plan, and supervise his forces [Ref. 24) 
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Thus the supporting element "translate the commander's decision into plans and orders" 
reinforces that portion of the doctrinal catcgory definition which discusscs the need for a 
"means to apply his decision effectively" Similarly, the supporting clement which states 
that a C"j system should provide "the capability to view friendly and enemy force data as it 
is received" clarifies (and provides resolution to) thc categOl)" dcfinition assertion that a 
C4 ] system should help a commander "supervise his forces" 
In this manner, a subset of the 29 supporting elements were determined to fit within 
the first doctrinal category; Table 2 reflects this subset. The same logic was applied to fit 
supporting elements within the remaining four doctrinal categories, with some supporting 
elemcnts appearing in more than one doctrinal cah:gory. Ultimately, all 39 supporting 
element statements were successfully placed into the doctrinal framework, suggesting that 
the framework is indeed inclusivc of all Marinc Corps C4 ] doctrine. A summary of the 
distribution of supporting clements under each doctrinal category is included in the 
sections that follow 
Once the inelusiveness of the doctrinal categories was established, MOEs selected 
from the literature were mapped into the doctrinal categories of the framework, and 
further related to the supporting elements already listed under each doctrinal category; 
the supporting elements were used to categorize the MOEs because they provided 
increased resolution to the doctrinal category definitions. The increased resolution, in 
turn, was deemed necessary due to the specificity of many of the MOEs. Like supporting 
clements, MOEs were put.into the framework based on the author's interpretation of their 
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relationship to the categories_ This interpretation was based on the statt:d definition of 
each MOE, as well as their respective statements of purpose 
A C' ~)'stem "ensures sulxlrdinatc cmnlnanders receive ideas and con~epts not juS! d3!n packages 
A C' system ~hould "tran~late the commander's deci~ions into plans and orders " 
Ac'system ' supervise the execution of tho sa plans and ordafS " 
"The MAGTF commander must be abla to maka and Imptement decisions laster than the enemy, so as 
to gain the in itiative and create tactical advantages for the MAGTF • 
A C' system should possess the "capability tor MEF and MEB command elements to conduct rapid 
miSSIOn planning at a level comparable to that of a MEU," 
A C' system should possess the ' capability to view friendly and enemy force data as it is received." 
A C' systam should possess the ' capability to complementlhe commander's situational awareness and 
' Support planning for future operations by offering the commander the ability to gah or create an image 
althe battlefield at range~ in time and distance beyond the soopeof currentaperations" 
Table 2. Subset ofSupportmg Elements for first Doctrinal Category 
Sections I through 5 below present the details of the framt:work, with each section 
titled by the doctrinal category to be presented, Following the title is the definition ofthc 
doctrinal category. This definition is itself followed by the header "supporting clcments," 
under which arc listed the supporting elements included in the dOL1rinai category. Each 
supporting element is preceded hy a lower case letter (in alphabetical order, starting with 
(a)), which will be used to reference the respective supporting element in Tablc~ 3 through 
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The table which follows the list of supporting elements in each section portrays the 
MOEs included in the doctrinal category_ Next to each MOE, an "X" is recorded below 
the letter of each supporting element that it measures. For example, in Table 3, the MOE 
"Number of Orders Issued" can be used to measure supporting elements (a) ("places 
decision making at the lowest possible level"), and (b) ("ensures subordinate commanders 
receive ideas and concepts, not just data packages"). An empirical indication of MOE 
perfonnance within a doctrinal category can be detennined by counting the number of 
supporting elements it measures A full description of each MOE, including 
computational methods and references, is included in Appendix A. 
As part of this research, the MOEs within each doctrinal category are ranked 
according to the extent to which each provides a real istic assessment of how well a C'I 
system meets the stated C'l system requirements within the doctrinal category_ The 
rankings for the MOEs within each doctrinal category are included in the last column of 
each table Rankings were accomplished using expert opinion garnered by a 
questionnaire Questionnaires were completed by twelve respondents, including eleven 
Marine Officers and one NPS Operations Research Department professor. The ranked 
lists were analyzcd using a variant of the Method of Successive Interval Scaling, where 
experts arc asked to rank instances in tenns of how much of a property they possess [Ref 
251_ The questionnaire and resulting caleulations are included in Appendix B. 
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I. DoctriJlal Category; Facilitate Commander's I.nnu tnce of Events 
"No coherent battle plan is possible without the commander's vision of how he 
in tends to win. The C' system, imbued by his intent , provides the means to apply his 
decision effectively, galher and analyze information, implement his plan, and supervise his 
forces" [Ref. 24 J 
a. Supporting Element.~ 
(a) A C1 system "places decision making at the lowest possible level" [Ref. 81 
(b) A C' system "ensures subordinate commanders receive ideas and concepts, 
not just data packages" [Ref 81 
(c) A C' system should "translate the commander's decisions into plans and 
orders' [Ref. 261 
Cd) A C" system should "supervise the execution of those plans and orders." 
[Ref 26] 
(c) "The MAGTF commander must be able to make and implement decisions 
faster than the enemy, so as to gain the init iative and create tactical advantages for the 
MAGTF to exploit." [Ref. 11 
(f) Should possess the "capability for MEf and MF.B conunand elements to 
conduct rapid mission planning at a level comparahle to that of a MEU." [Ref. 11 
(g) Should possess the "capability to view mendly and enemy force data as it is 
received." [Ref. 11 
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(h) Should possess the "capability to complement the commander's si tuational 
awareness and instincts " [Ref 11 
(i) "Support planning for filture operations by offering the commander the 
ability to gain or create an image of the battlefield at ranges in time and distance beyond 
the scope of current operations." [Ref I] 
MaaSllre of Effecliveness 
System cnotribution to the 
perception of the enemy 
y time ordered 
Measures These Supporting 
Elements 
(a) (b) (e) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
\-P'_"_""_"_'d-,-"_"_" _r~i_~_'._"_"'--"'_"_'d~~+ +++-+--HY--+~~·_ 
X X I Percent planning time forwarded 
X X 
Number of orders Issued Ix X 
Percent of personnel informed X X 
jwarning to operations order ratio X X X 
Ability to develop courses ofacHon 
ITacticalPicture quality 
Display procassing time 
" Table 3_ Facllttate Conunander's Influence of Events 
The MOEs with the highest perfonnance rankings in Table 3 are "Tactical 
Picture Quality" and "System Contribution to the Conunander's Perception of the Enemy· 
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This result i~ consistent with fundamental concepts of C41 for the Warrior and maneuver 
warfare, which are "to provide the knowledge and understanding the commander needs" 
so that his decision cycle is faster than his opponent's IRef 2]. Measures with two oflhe 
three highest performance rankings in Table 3 also deal with the decision process ("System 
Contribution to Commander's Perception of the Enemy" and "Ability to Develop Courses 
of Action"), while percentage ("Percent Orders Clarification Requested") and event 
measures ("Numhcr of Orders Issued") have lower ranks. Additionally, Ihe two measures 
with the lowest performance rankings, "Display Processing Time" and "Number of Orders 
issued," can be used to measure less than th~ tahl~ average of three supporting el~ments 
(as measured by the number of X's along a row). Doctrinal requirement (i), dealing with 
providing the commander the ability to view the battlefield beyond current operations, is 
wcalJy supported with only one MOE (one X in the (i) column) 
2. Doctrinal Category: Adapt to the Situlltion 
'The commander must be free to move and lead from any point in the baulespace 
Therefore, the (1 system must have the flexibility to adapt to his needs rapidly_" [Ref 24J 
IL Supporting Elements 
(a) A C' system possess the characteristic of~flexibility_~ [Ref 24] 
(b) A C' system should "communicate those plans and orders (see category I 
"translate commander's decisions into plans and orders") to subordinates." [Ref 26] 
(c) A C' system "must be easy to establish, easy to maintain, and reconfigure" 
[Ref 1] 
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(d) The system "must adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting 
opportunities." [Ref 271 
(e) Should possess the "capability to support merging forces and expanding to 
larger MAGTFs without disrupting continuity of operations. · [Ref I] 
(I) Should possess the "capability for the conunander to view friendly and 
enemy force data as it is received," [Ref I] 
(g) Should possess the "capability to support planning on the move." [Ref I] 
(h) "Must satisfy the command and control requirements of the 'vfAGTF 
commander afloat, ashore, or in transition," [Ref IJ 
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Measure 01 Elfectiveness Menur .. ThenSupportin; Performance 
Elements 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (I) (;)(h) 
Time Irom mission toordar 
Time 10 d&clslon rallo 
Set upand taardOWlltlrne 
Percent of commumcatlOns with alternate routes 
Grade of servICe 
System access 
Disp layprocessingtll'Tla 12 
Database size consistency. 
Tactlcalpictureconsislency 
Mean dissemination hme 
Percent informed 
Abil;ty to reconfigure 
Percenl messages displayed Inaccuralely 
Number of orders issued II 
Number 01 duplicale reports II 
Tac\ica l plClure qualrty II 
Table 4. Adapt to the SnuatlOn. 
For the measures presented in Table 4, number counts ("Number of Duplicate 
Repons" and "Number of Orders Issued") seem to be ranked lower than time measures 
("Time from Mission to Order" and "Time 10 Decision Ratio"), which reflC(;ts the 
imponance of tempo in maneuver warfare, especially when dealing with the commander's 
ability to adapt to a changing situation. Measures dealing with displays and databases also 
seem to be less imponant than decisionmaking and mobility MOEs. The average number 
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of supporting elements that can be measured by an MOE (the average number of X's in a 
row) is between one and two 
3. Doc(rinal Category: Support Inrnrmation Requirements 
"The commander's C' support system must provide a reliable, secure, fast and 
durable information network that allows him to implement his operational concepts .. 
information must be: timely, accurate, complete, objective, useable, relevant, positioned 
properly, mobile, accessible and fused" [Ref 24] 
a. Supporting Elements 
(a) "There must be a means to provide accurate navigation down to the smallest 
unit to reduce the amount of conununications and improve conunand and control 
effectiveness" [Ref lJ 
(b) A C' system "provides universal availability of data with selected access 
based on a commander's mission and needs. " [Ref 8] 
(c) A C' system "provides battle-relevant, theater and national databases having 
common data c1ements.~ [Ref 8] 
(d) A Cl system should "facilitate (the) rapid, distributed and unconstrained 
flow of information in all directions." [Ref 28J 
[Ref 28] 
(e) A C' system should "filter. fuze and prioritize information." [Ref 281 
(1) A C' system should "provide echelon jumping capability." [Ref 28] 
(g) A c< system should "provide vertical, lateral. and diagonal redundancy.~ 
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(h) A CO system should "provide the commander accurate, timely information 
and ideas for developing f!:3Sible courses of action and making logical decisions" [Ref. 
26] 
(i) "SatisfY the commander's critical information requirements, and makt: those 
clements of information available in a timely fashion and in the most useable form, 
supporting both supply-push anel demand-pull ," [Ref 1] 
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Number of options remaining 14 
Percent commander's critica l 
requirements met 
Proportionfr.endly sKimenls engaged (fralrk:ide) 
Ability to develop courses of action 
Display processing time 
Database siza consislency I X X I X 17 
Tactical picture consistency 
Digital map capabilily I X 
Ab~ity to support overlays 
Syslem tasking timaHnass 
Percent of messages displayed Inaccurately 12 
Average time Irom threat detectIOn to identification. X 4 
f- - f--
Time potential threat undetected ratio X 5 
Tactical picture quality 
t-- - 1- , 
Sensor effectiveness 
Table 5. Suppon InformatIOn ReqUirements 
For Table 5, the measures which gauge the satisfaction of a commanders 
information requirements ("Percent Commander's Critical Information Requirements 
Met"), overall system speed ("System Tasking Timeliness"), and knowledge of the enemy 
("Tactical Picture Quality" and· Average Time from Threat Detection to Identification") 
rank the highest in measuring overall information requirements. Measures of subsy5lem 
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equipment penomlance (incillding "Sensor Effectiveness" and "Disp lay Processing 
Time"), are ranked lowest for measuring suppol1 of information requirements_ Supporting 
elements (f) and (g), dealing with echelon jumping and system redundancy, arc weakly 
supported with only one MOE 
4. Doctrinal Category: Elploit MAGTF Capabiliiies 
"The C' support system must 
-Support the MAGTF during all types of deployment and employment 
-Enable the f...tAGIF to maintain mobility (notc' this is not the same as commander's 
freedom to move in the banlcspacc) 
-Survive enemy weapons systems and C' warfare 
-Sustain the MAGTF 
-Provide the flexibility to task organize 
-fnterface with other C1 systems (Joint, combined, NCA, other services/federal 
agencies) [Ref 24] 
tL Supporting Elements 
(a) A C' system should possess the characteristics of deployahility, mobility, 
flexibility, integratability, interoperability [Ref. 24] 
(b) Should "allow seamless transfer of information within naval forces and 
between naval forces and joint commands." [Ref. 8] 
(c) "Provides rapid simultaneous access of multiple users throughout the chain 
of (;ommand and to external commands and agencies as appropriate." [Ref. 8] 
(d) Communications must be "easy to establish, maintain and reconfigure." [Ref. 
IJ 
(e) "Cl employment options cannot be considered independent of deployment 
options." [Ref. 11 
47 
(I) A C' system should have the capability to "deploy rapidly, operate under 
austere conditions and at extended ranges, and project and maintain from a sea-base." 
[Ref I] 
(g) A C' sy~tem "should be able to withstand disruptions of all kinds created 
by the enemy or self-induced ," [Ref. I] 
Meesure 01 Effectiveness 
Supporting Etemanli 
(11.) (b) (c) (d) (e) (I) (II) 
Percent communications links with allernate rOl<tes 10 
8alance of trafficthrOl.lghol.lt network 
Salcomsl.lpportabi lily. x X 
Percentlilformed 
Ralio ofSl.lppl,es consumed versus prO\l ided 
Mean lime response 10 jamming 
Personnel requiremenls improvement. 3 
)weapons syslems equivalenls I --~ 
b-~~-~~--~-----------~-+~~+-~-----, 
Dalabase sile consistency 16 
Tactica l picture consistency 
Transportation requirements improvement X X 
Indexofavailabilily 
IndexofSl.lrvivability 
I_T_""_'P~M_'_bit~itY~i"_d'_' ______________ ~-+-+~~+-j __ ~, 
System access 
'~------------------~~+-j-+~-~I------
Abilil'j10 Hlconligur9 2 
Table 6, Exploit MAG1F Capabthtaes 
48 
For Table 6, those measures which deal with mobi lity and dcployabili ty ("Ability to 
Reconfigure" and "Personnel Requirements Improvement") arc ranked high for their 
pcrformance in assessing a C41 system's ability to exploit MAGTF capabili ties 
Interestingly, measures which deal with combat service support ("Ratio of Supplies 
Consumcd Versus Provided") and information ("Percent !n[onncd" and "Database Size 
Consistency") are ranked at the bottom All supporting elements in Tablc 4 can be 
measured by alleast three MOEs 
5. Doctrinal Category: Support CP Effectiveness 
A command post (C l system) needs to he able to survive, and also to fight [Ref 24] 
A tradcoff. however, exists between fighting and survival as shown in Figure 6 






















Figure 6_ Survive and Fight Tradeoff. From Ref [24] 
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a. Supporting Elements 
(a) A C' system should possess the characteristics of survivability and 
sustainability. [Ref 24] 
(b) "Provides rapid simultaneous access of multiple users throughout the chain 
of command and to external commands and agencies as appropriate." [Ref. 8 J 
(c) "Displays a scaleable, near real-time, shared picture of the battlefield.' [Ref. 
8] 
(d) "c' facilities must be able to operate on the move" [Ref. I] 
(e) "There is a need to reduce the number of transmissions and transmission 
time, thereby reducing the electronic signature." [Ref. 1] 
[Ref 26] 
(f) Should facilitate "rapid and rrequent displacements" [Ref. 1] 
(g) Organization should "ensure unity of conunand" [Ref. 27 J 
(h) "Organization should also ensure reasonable span of control (3-7 units)." 
(i) Must have an "echelonment capability" (A and B commands for 
displacement). [Ref. 1] 
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MeesUfGsof ENectivlnen 
COmmunicalions performance index {C<lpacily 
ran~e, secu.ily. mob.lity. dependability) 
M,m,,, Th,,, S,,,.rt;,, p,rt"m"" I 
Elements 
(1I) I (b) (e) (d) (I) (I) (II) (h) (i) 
I-T,_m,_,_, d_",_;'_'OO_"_~io ___ _ __ ++-,--H-+--'l ~ X ~50 
Average messagG backlog 
Pe rcen~ of nel capaci~y ut ilization 
\Grade o/service 
Ipe rcenl of actions in illated by time ordered 
Display processing l ime 
Percenl of personnel informed 
Se~ - u p and lear-down lime 
Ab ility 10 reconfigure 
Personnel requ irements improvement 
System tasking timeliness 
Percent radiO links up 
Messages lost dueto radIO links down 
Numberofduplicale reoorts 
Tactical picture quality x X X 
Tacticat picture consistency 
Averagemessageduratk>n 
TransDortability index 
Index of survivability 
Inde~ of availability 
1 able 7, Support CP Effectiveness 
In the calegory of Supporting Cl' Effectiveness, MOE~ dealing with 
communications ("Communications Performance Index"), S}'5tem displays and information 
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("Tactical Picture Quality"), and mobility ("Transportability Index") are ranked high in 
performance Specific counts and percentage measures ("Percent of Personnel Infonned " 
and "Number of Duplicate Reports") are assessed as relatively poor measures of CP 




Riding the crest of the "information age" and what has been described as a 
"revolution in mil itary affairs," C' I technologies are emerging a~ the force multipliers of 
future battlefields_ Currenl initiatives strive to push information and intell igl;,lOcc to 
increasingly lower echelons of command, without exceeding the commander's capacity to 
sift and assimilate what is pertinent. However, due to past shortcomings in COl 
procurement, and the high cost of emerging technologies, upgrades to CUITent COl syslem~ 
and new C'I acquisitions arc subjeckd to intense analysis 
2. C'I Evaluation Methodologies 
A multitude of CI evaluation methodologies exist, each approaching the problem of 
comparative analysis in a slightly diflerent manner. Available techniques include the 
CDEA, MCES, MOA, HEAT, evolutionary upgrade paths, and functional decomposition 
methods . Impurtantly, ('I evaluation methodologies can be combined into hybrid 
techniques that benefit from the strengths of individual techniques 
Current practice in the Marine Corps and other services has established the COEA 
as the de facio framewurk for conducting C'I system comparative analyses. The COEA 
methodulogy, huwever. is broad enough to accept input from other, potentially more 
precise, evaluatiun techniques. The strength of the MCES lies in its initial focus on 
problem definition and the environment, rather than a premature focus on a quantitative 
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modeL MCES also enjoys a commonality of terms and structure which simplify its 
application. The MOA focuses on obtaining required input from political and military 
decisionmakers prior to defining an analytical question. HEAT has been successfully 
applied to military C"I systems, and represents a systematic methodology using 
pre-defined measures Evnlut ionary upgrade path concepts help provide greater 
,rsolution when comparing alternate systems with similar capabilities Functional 
decompositions use varied approaches which couch an analysis in terms of required 
system capabilities 
Although any hybrid combination of methodologies would only be developed in the 
context of the analysis at hand, one such combination that suggests itself might be a 
COEA which employs the first four modules of MCES for problem definition, and 
evolutionary upgrade paths for distinguishing the best ofa subset of "good" systems 
3. MOEs 
The identification of realistic ~tOEs is a common thread which binds the various C' I 
evaluation methodologies. Unique MOEs may be required for a specific analysis. and can 
be generated using MCES, MOA, evolutionary upgrade paths, or functional 
decompositions_ Importantly, many useful MOEs already exist from past analyses, C"I 
literature, and academia The ACCES, for instance, uses a pre-defined set of measures 
which remain constant from analysis to analysis. The proposed framework for 
calcgori1.ing MOEs in Chapter III, based on relevant doctrine, provides a tool for 
identifying and maintaining those MOEs with broad applicability to Marine Corps c"I 
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system evaluation_ The framework can change dynamically with emerging doctrine, and 
can also incorporate new MOEs developed by thc application of MCES or other MOE 
generating methodologies 
Imponantly, the framework provides a staning point for increased resolution in 
categorizing C' I MOEs for use in Marine Corps related analysis. Potential sub-categories 
that may provide greater detail include functionality (i. c .• is a component primarily for C l , 
communications, intelligence, or interoperability?), and compatibility (e.g .. is the system 
employable inside existing vehicle spaces and CP configurations?). 
For the measures identified in the literature, those MOEs which go beyond number 
counts and percentages seem 10 promise better performance in measuring doctrinal CI 
system requirements. Higher level measures, especially Tactical Picture Quality, enjoyed 
high performance rankings across mulliple doctrinal categories. The identification of 
existing measures which provide high performance provides a logical starting point for 
refinement and identification ofsimilarJy powerful MOEs 
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APPBNDIX A. MOE DESCRIPTIONS 
A. DEFL'I1TiONSAND RATlONALK 
1. MOE: System Contrihutioll to Commander's Perception of the Enemy 
Definition. The total number of enemy urug upon which there is intelligence 
information in a database, the age orthe intelligence infonnalion, and current time within 
the ~ccnario_ The output is a cumulative graph of the number of enemy units upon which 
there is intelligence information versus lime [Ref 23 ] 
Rationale: The commander's perception or the battlefield has a direct impact on the 
dedsion that he will make, This measure attempts to assess the contribution of the C4 J 
system to the commander's decision making process, and provide for a comparative 
analysis of alternatives for supporting the commander's decision making process 
.sJHlllQIll;. Facilitate Conunander's Influence of Evcnts 
2. MOE: Percent Action Initiated by Time Ordtrtd 
Definition: The percentage of all act ions initiated in response to orders that are 
initiated within the time specified by the order [Ref. 23] 
Rationale: This measure addresses the timeliness of subordinate reaction to orders, 
and by extension the timeliness of the CI system in processing, transmitting, and 
displaying the orders to subordinate commander's 
Sllp-l).Q.ill.;. Facilitate Commander's Intluence of Events, Suppon CP Effectiveness 
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3. MOE: Mean Dissemination Time 
Definition The time required to disseminate an order, directive, or warning to all 
elements at the next lower echelon of command [Ref 23 ] 
Rationale: This measure directly measures the timeliness of a C4[ system in 
disseminating orders 
~ Facilitates Commander's Influence of Events, Adapt to the Situation 
4. ]\10E: Percent Orders Clarification Requested 
Definitjon' The percentage of total orders issued (can include frag orders), for 
which any suhordinate element requested clarification [Ref 29] 
Percent Orders Clarification Requested = ""mb':~~:;;;;:::::;::;~w.J X 100 
Rationale: This measure addresses the clarity of the orders issued, indirectly 
addressing the quality of orders produced by the CI system. It is also an indirect measure 
of the like-mindedness of subordinate and senior commanders 
.fu!~ Facilitates Commander's Jnfluence of Evenu 
5. MOE: Time to Decision Ratio 
Definition The proportion of time from receipt of mission until time of execution 
that is devoted to a commander's decision [Ref 23]. 
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Rationale: This measure addresses the effectiveness of a ("1 system It is assumed 
that the CT system which provides the most re!evant information, the most assistance in 
preparing an order, the best standard operating procedures, and the best human interface 
with technology will require less time to finalize an order 
fudRP.J.!..(li;. Facilitates Commander's Influence of E~'ents, Adapt 10 the Situation, 
Support Information Requirements, Support cr Effectiveness 
6. MOE: Percent }'tanning Time Forwarded 
~ The percentage oflolal planning time availahle that an echelon allows to 
al110wer echelons [Ref 23 ) 
Percenl Plallning Time Forwarded - (J - Time to lkcision Ratio) X 100 
Rationale This measure addresses C'I system effectiveness by assessing tbe 
planning time required to develop and issue an order in relation to the time available 
Marine Corps doctrine calls for passing filly percent of the available time to mission to 
~ubordinatcs 
Supports: Facilitate Commander's Influence of Even Is 
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7. MOE: Time from Mission to Order 
Definition: The elapsed time at one echelon of command from the moment of 
receiving a mission to the moment of issuing the responsive order to the next lower 
echelon lRef. 23] 
RatiQnal!;~ This measure directly measures the timeliness of the command fimction 
It includes planning time, decision time, and time to prepare and disseminate the order. It 
is assumed that the bcst COl system will have the fastest time from mission to order. The 
measure may also be used to compare the command function in different envirorunents, 
c.g., mobile vs stationary, or afloat vs ashore 
29) 
.sJ!~ facilitate Commander's [rilluence of Events, Adapt to the Situation 
8. MOE: Number of Orders Issued 
Definition: A simple number count of the orders issued for a given operation [Ref. 
Rationale: This measure directly measures the amount of command and control and 
is considered an indication of amount needed, which itself relates to cost or burden 
Additionally, this assesses indirectly the commander's perception of the battlefield (better 
perception relates to less orders), and the extent to which subordinate commanders are 
receiving ideas and concepts (the better they understand the situation the less direction 
they will require) 
~ Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events, Adapt fa the Situation 
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9. MOE: Percent of Personnel Informed 
Definition: The percentage of personnel aware of an information item when asked 
[Ref. 291 
Rationale· This measure addresses the e:den\ to which a system provides the same 
information to all users, or the extent 10 which subordinate commanders receive ideas and 
infonnation, or how well a system is performing in different environments (e.g., on the 
move vs stationary) 
~ Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events, Adapt to the Situation, 
Exploit MAGTF Capabilities, Support CP Effectiveness 
10. MOE: Warning Order to Operations Order Ratio 
Definition: The number of warning orders divided by the number of operations 
orders (can include [rag orders) [Ref 29] 
Rationale This measure assesses Ihe enent to which subordinate commanders are 
receiving ideas and concepts, vice data. It also assesses the extent to which all 
commanders arc operating otT the same tactical picture 
~ Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events 
II. MOE: Ability to De"'elop Courses of Action 
Definition: The time necessary to develop courses of action given commander's 
guidance [Ref 30] 
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Rationale: This measure assesses the extent to which a C'1 system facil itates the 
development of COAs It is assumed a superior C'I system wil! be faster than an inferior 
system 
Supports : Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events, Support Information 
Requirements 
12. MOE: Tactical Picture Quality 
Definitio!l. Measured by a function of completeness of tactical picture, accuracy of 
identification, and accuracy of position indication [Ref 31 J 
Rationale ' This measure assesses the accuracy of the tactical infomlation provided 
by the C4 1 system. Tactical picture quality will impact the commander's perception of the 
battlefield, as well as staffplanning 
Supoorts: Facilitate Commander's Influence of Events, Adapt to the Situation, 
support Information Requirements, Support CP Effectiveness 
13. MOE: Display Processing Time 
Definition: Duration of time between receipt of information at C'I node and time 
when information fi rst appears at a display where decision-making process begins [Ref. 
31] 
Rationale' This measure assesses the timeliness of a portion of the C·1 system. It is 
assumed that the system with the fastest display processing time will be superior to those 
with slower display processing times Note that this mt:asure corresponds to the observe 
portion of the Boyd Cycle 
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Supports: Facili tate Commander's Influence of Events, Adapt to the Situation, 
support Information Requirements, Support CP Effectiveness 
14. MOE: Set-up and Tear-down Time 
Definition Set-up lime is the elapsed time from CP site selection to operational 
capability of the CI system Tear-down time is the time required to dismantle the system 
and load it aboard transporta tion [Ref. 30]. 
Ration~ This measure addresses the flexibility of a C41 system A system which 
can be installed and dismantled quickly will be morc responsive, survivable, and mobile 
~ Adapt 10 the Situation, Suppurt CP Effectiveness 
15. MOE: Pcrctllt Communications with Alternate R outes 
Definition fhe percentage of all estahlished node to node communications links 
that also have an existing alternate route for communications [Ref 29] 
Rationale: This measure addresses the robustness of a C"I system Alternale 
communications routes ease message backlogs, resist jarruning efft:cts, and increase 
timeliness 
Sunports: Adapt to the Situation, Exploit MAGTF Capabilities 
16. MOE: Grad e of Service 
Definition: The probability tbat a subscribt:r al any randomly chost:n instant will be 
able to obtain a circuit connection to his party [Ref. 29] 
Rationale This measure assesses the responsiveness and quality of a C41 system A 
bettt:r grade of service suggests a belief flow of information between echelons of 
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command and within CPs. Comparing grades of service allows analysis of CPs in differcnt 
states (e.g., mobile vs stationary) 
Supports : Adapt to the Situation, Support Tnfonnation Requirements, Support CP 
Effectiveness 
17. MOE: System Access 
Defmition : Proportion of time requested that the I\-1AGTF commander was given 
access to a specific (shipboard) system to support (OTH) operations (Ref3 L) 
Rationale: This measure assesses the responsiveness and supportability of a CI 
system. Due to cquipment constraints afloat, as well as satellite access and bandwidth 
constraints atloat or ashore, the MAGTF commander may not enjoy unlimited access to 
C'I assets Examples include limited W-3 shipboard satellite antennas, and limited SHF 
salcom bandwidth for GMF terminals ashore 
s~ Adapt to the Situation, Exploit MAGTF Capabilities 
18. MOE: Database Size Consistency 
Definition : Proportion of database consistency between the MAGTF headquarters 
and selected subordinate units [Ref 31 ]. 
Database size consistency ~ I _ ((-"-YIMx-~ .. +(x-y") ) 
where : x = database size ofMAGTF headquarters 
yn = database size of nth seLected subordinate unit 
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~ This measure addresses the consistency of a cor system, and the extent 
to which commanders and staffs at different echelons have access to the same amount of 
infonnation 
Suppons Adapt to the Situation, Support InfOlma!ion Requirements, Exploit 
MAGTF Capabilities 
19. MOE: Tactical rictureConsistency 
.J:kfi.nition: Measured by relative comparisons of displays, similarity of 
identification, and similarity of position infonnation [Ref. 31] 
Rationale_ This measure assesses the extent to which commanders and slaft); at 
different echelons are operating with the same tactical picture. It may be correlated wilh 
number of orders issued, database size consistency and percent orders correction 
requested 
SUPPOTts Adapt to the Situation, Support Infonnation Requirements, Exploit 
MAGTF Capabilities, Support CP Efiectiveness 
20. MOE: Ability to Reconfigure 
De.fu!i1!2rr;. Measured by time to initialize system, time to backup system, and time 
to reboot system [Ref. 30] 
Rationale: This system addresses C'( s}'!>1cm flexibility and mobility It is assumed 
that a quicker time ror each element orthe me-.!Sure is desirahle 
~ Adapt to the Situation, Exploit MAGTF Capabilities, Support CP 
Effectiveness 
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21. MOE: Percent Messages Displayed Inaccurately 
Definition: The percentage of messages received that were displayed inaccurately 
[Ref. 29] 
~ This measure assesses C4 1 system accuracy and system infonnation 
rdiabil ity 
~ Adapt to the Situation, Suppon fnfonnation Requirements 
22. MOE: Number of Duplicate Reports 
Definition: A number count of the number of individual repons displayed multiple 
times [Ref 31] 
Rationale: This measure addresses the quality of a C"l system It also forms a basis 
fo r comparison between CPs in different states (e. g .. does the mobile CP have more 
duplicate repons than the stationary CP 
~ Adapt to the Situation, Suppon CP Effectiveness 
23, MO£; Number of Options Remaining 
Definition: The number of decision points open multiplied by the number of options 
for each decision point [Ref 23J 
li..a~ This measure addresses the quality ofa system in supponing planning for 
courses of action, and the amount of flexibility left to the commander. The C4J system 
which presents the greater number of tactical options for a commander is assumed to be 
superim 
~ Suppon Infonnation Requirements 
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24. MOE: Perecnt Commander's Critical Information Requirements Met 
Definition The percentage of commander's critical infonnation requirements met, 
where commander's critical information requirements are defmed by Marine Corps 
doctrine [Ref 30] 
Rationale: This measure assesses the quality of a system The CI system which 
presents the greatest percentage ofCCIRs is assumed superior 
.fu!pp..Q.& Support Infonnation Requirements 
25. MOE: Proportion Friendly Elements Engaged (Fratridde) 
Definition rhe number of friendly elements erroneously engaged divided by the 
number of friend ly elements in the engagement area [Ref 23] 
Rationale This measure addresses one of the most catastrophic failures in CI, 
"friendly fire" By extension, this measure assesses the quality of the tactical picture at 
lower echelons, and the extent to whieh all echelons are operating from the same tactical 
picture 
~ Support Infonnation Requirements 
26, MOE; Digital Map Capability 
~ Measured by time to generate map display and time to generate scanned 
map [Ref 301 
Rationale: This measure addresse~ the timeliness or the C'l system with regard to 
map displays 
Syp~ Support Information Requirements. 
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27. MOE: Ability to Support O\'rrlays 
~ Measured by time to generate map overlays and time to disseminate map 
overlays to lower echelons other staff sections [Ref. 30J. 
Rationale This measure addresses the timeliness of a CI system with regard to 
overlays 
~ Support Infonnation Requirements 
28. MOE: Systr m Tasking Timrliness 
Definition; The time infonnation is received from a database inquiry minus the time 
the inquiry was initiated [Ref. 31] 
Rationale' This measure assesses the timeliness ora C41 system It can also be used 
to compare the system timeliness in different configurations (e.g., mobile or stationary) 
S!!.p..P..ill1& Support Information Requirements, Support CP Effectiveness 
29. MOE: Avcrage Time rrom Threat Detection to Identification 
Definition : The average of all times from threat detection to threat identification 
[Ref. 32J 
lS.ationale This measure addresses the timeliness of the intelligence function of a 
('I system 
.fump..QI1.S.: Support Infonnation Requirements 
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30. MOE: Time Potential Threat Undetected Ratio 
Definition- The length of time an enemy thrl;.-:at is within the system sensor envelope 
before detection divided by the total length of lime an em::my threat is within the envelope 
[Ref 32J 
Rationale: This measure addresses the sensor effectiveness of a C'1 system. By 
extension. the measure can be used to assess the timeliness of reporting within the system 
( i.e. , time before detection can actually be time before threat detection report is displayed 
at a particular echelon) 
fuu?P.ill1£ Suppan Information Requirements 
31. MOE: Sensor Effectiveness 
Definition: The number of reports received hy sensor type divided by the total 
number of sensor reports received [Ref 311 
Rational\;.; This measure assesses Ih!;! effectiveness of the sensors associated with a 
CIsystem 
~ Support Information Requirements 
32. MOE: Balance of Traffic Through Network 
Definition: The average utilization of each communications node and link [Ref 291 
Rationale: This measure assesses the criticality of communications nodes and links, 
as well as the overall system survivability and compactness of the system (e.g., a system 
with low utilization of many links may in fact have extraneous parts) 
fump.JlJll.: Exploit MAGTF Capabilities 
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33. MOE: SatCom Supportability 
Definition The theoretical satellite uplink channel capacity is measured by 
R -=. WS / r (~) ( )(J+I+SJ I-t(K' 7W) I] 
_ ,N. Y "\ 'f ) 
where 
R ~ Transmitted data rate capacity of a sa/eltite uplink channel 
W - spread spectrom bandwidth 
S = uplink signal Effective Instantaneolls Radiated Pawer (EfRP) 
E/N. ~ reqllired post correlation signal-to-lloise 
r - signal S1lppression to the transponder 
J - enemy jammer EfRP 
I - ,~lIm of other uplink signals' EfRP 
E = satellite full outp1lt downlink EllU' 
L - downfink path loss 
/C = Boltzman's constalll 
GIT ~ receiver Earth termina/figure a/merit 
[Ref 29] 
Rationale: This measure assesses the amount of bandwidth available to a C'I system 
utilizing SHF satcom communications 
~ Exploit MAGTF Capabilities 
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34. MO E: Ratio of Supplies Consumed Versus Provided 
Definition: The ratio of the quantity of supplies (by class) wnsumed 10 the quantity 
of supplies provided by the C55 system (Ref. 23] 
Rationale- This measure addresses the relative degree to which supply consumption 
can be satisfied by the CSS system It is assumed that the faster C41 system will speed and 
enhance the satisfaction of supply demands thereby reducing the ratio toward one 
Slrnp..Q.l:!£ Exploit MAGTF Capabilities 
35. MOE: Mean Time Response to Jam ming 
Q.ctini.1i.ill1. The arithmetic mean of each elapsed response time to jamming of 
friendly communications [Ref 33] 
Rational.£.: This measure addresses the effectiveness of one countermeasure aspect 
of a (4{ system 
S.lJ.ll.PM1.5.; Exploit "MAGTF Capabilities 
36, MOE: Personnel Requirements Improvement 
DefinitioQ; rhe net change in personnel requirements, including operators and 
maintaincrs, ofonc C'I system over another IRef 341 
Rationale.;. This measure assesses the personnel overhead and, by extension, the 
comp lexity ofa C"I system. Results can also be linked to system deployability 
.fu!JmQr.tx Exploit MAGTF Capabilities, Support CP Effectiveness 
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37. MOE: Weapons Systems Equivalents 
Definition- The number count of a particular weapons system which can he 
considered equivalent to the C41 system in question (e.g., 1 JTIDS equipped £'-15 is 
equivalent to 1.3 non-JTIDS equipped F-15s) [Ref 35] 
~ This measurc asscsscs thc force effectiveness of a CI system. and puts 
the result in tcrms easily understandable to multiple warfighting specialties (e.g., an annor 
officer can readily visualize the value of a C"l system if he knows its tank battalion 
equivalence). The enumeration of this measure will usually require a separate analysis 
SUPP-O& Exploit l\1AGTF Capabilities 
38, MOE: Transportation Requirements Improvement 
Ikfini1jon The net change in transportation requirements of one C"I 5ystem over 
another [Ref 341 
Rationa~.:. This measure addresses C'1 system deployabiEty and support 
requirements. It may also provide a measure of tactical mobility. 
Support~ Exploit l\1AGTF Capabilities 
39. MOE: Index of Availability 
Definition: Consists of some or all of the following availability measures 
Operational Availabilily - (MTBJ.) / (M7HF -I MDT) 
[nnerCIJI A milabilily - (MTBF) / (MTBF + MlTR) 
Achieved Availahility = (MTRF) / (MTBF + MTTR -I M1TPj 
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where 
MTBF '" mean lIme between/ailure 
!YIDT = mean down time 
MTTR = meall lime (0 repail 
J'v!TTf' ~ mean lime fO perform scheduled maintenaflce 
[Ref 32] 
Rationale: Tllis measure addresses reliability and availability aspects of a C4 [ 
system 
Supports Exploit .MAGn; Capabilities, Support CP Effectiveness 
40. MOE: Indu. of SlIrvh:ability 
( i-Grade ojServiced'n"l'i"""""If) I Grade oj Service"'fo"lo"",">w 
rRef 32] 
Rationale This measure assesses system survivability in tenns of conununit:ations 
disruption 
S!!.P~ Exploit MAGTF Capabilities, Support CP Effectiveness 
41. MOE: Transportability Index 
T, = (m,) (d.) / d,) if do,?' d~ 
7;= m! ifd,,~dq 
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where 
7; - Transportahility index 
m, = total jth subsystem volume 
d.} = u~'erage density of jtll sub~ystem 
dQ = maximum load density for afully loaded vehicle 
[Ref 32J 
Rationale: This measure assesses deployability, mobility, and logistics requirements 
of a C'I system 
~ Exploit MAGTF Capabilities, Support CP Effectiveness 
42, MOt:: Communiclltions Performance Index 
Definition' The weighted sum of thc rat ios of obsetved performance to required 
performance over a sct ofrequircments [Ref 29J 
where 
w: = relative weight of euch requirement 
Pi -- performance ob~"(!rved 
R, - required performance 
Bationak: This measure is a gcneric assessment of a ("1 system over a number of 
stated requirements. Requirements could include: direct communication capacity, organic 
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wmmunication equipment, conference caU capability, specific range, security, mobility, 
dependability, vulnerability, etc 
.smw~ Support CP E!fedivcness 
43. MOr.: Average Message Backlog 
Definition: Tlu:: average number of messages awaiting transmission [Ref 29] 
Rationale This measure addresses the timeliness ofa C", system 
S.YimQ& Support CP Effectiveness 
44. MOE: Pen;entage of Net Capacity Utilization 
Definition: The total time a communication net carries traffic divided by the 101al 
time a net is obselVcd [Ref 29] 
Rationale" This measun:: can be used to address the necessity of a circuit, but is 
more often used to determine whether circuits approach overloading. 
fu!W...Q!1£;. Support CP Effectiveness 
45. MOE: Percent Radio l.inks Up 
Definition The number of radio links operational divided by the total number of 
radio links [Ref 35] 
Rationale: This measure addresses the perfonnance of the communications aspects 
of a C41 system, and can be used to compare system perfonnance in different locations and 
states 
~ Support CP Effectiveness 
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46. MOE: Number of Messages Lost Hue to Radio Links Down 
Definition: A numher count of the messages that were not transmitted or which lost 
their time-related value as a result of a radio circuit being down [Ref 35] 
Rationale: This measure addresses the reliability of infonnation flow in a C' I 
system 
~ Support CP Effectiveness 
47. MOE: Average Message Duration 
Definition: The sum of message transmission times divided by the number of 
messages [Ref 29] 
Rationale: rhis measures addresses the survivability of a C'I system in an EW 
environment 
Supports' Support CP Effectiveness 
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APPENDIX B. ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
Questionnaires were completed by twelve respondents, including eleven Marine 
Officers and one professor. The Marine participants included two infantry officers (both 
company grade), two artillery officers (one field grade, one company grade), and six 
communications olticers (one field grade and five company grade), who came from either 
the Joint C' , the Electrical Engineering, or the Operations Research curriculums. The 
faculty participant was an Operations Research professor with extensive expertise in 
combat modelling. The questionnaires are enclosed at the end of this appendix 
Respondents were initially asked to rank the MOEs based on three categories, 
including cost, ease of use, and performance. In practice, however, the questionnaires 
proved to be an unsuitable method to obtain cost and ease of use data, since both 
categories are most often a function of the C'l system being analyzed. Performance 
proved to be a tractable category, and complete ranked lists were obtained from each of 
the 12 participants 
The ranked lists were analyzed using a variant of the Method of Successive Interval 
Scaling, where experts are asked to rank. instances in terms of how much of a property 
they possess [Ref 25]. If X, represents an expert's interval scaled feelings about the 
amount of the property possessed by instance j, then the methodology requires two 
assumptions. The assumptions are 
(I) over an infinite number of experts, XJ is distributed normally with mean Sj and 
homogt:neous variance if, for all j 
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(2) The wrrclation coefficient between Xl and X, is the same for all ij 
In applying the method, a frequency matrix off,J values was obtained by counting the 
number of times the MOE in column j was ranked above the MOE in row i Table 8 
displays the f,J matrix resulting from the first doctrinal bin 
A B C D , F G H , , K L M 
Ill.!!!!ill 3 2 1 2 3 3 0 2 2 . , 0 
8 Hi!!::::',: 
· 
1 5 5 6 1 
· · 
5 9 1 
9 , :i!~ii'i 3 , 6 11 1 5 
· 
8 9 2 





8 9 2 
8 6 5 5 6 6 2 
· 
5 8 8 2 
8 5 0 035.122792 
11 10 8 8 9 9 10 II 9 8 10 11;---;--
9 , 
· 
. , , 9 '~" 9 , 
· 
. , 6 9 3 7 7 8 5 
, 6 1 1 3 5 . 1 ::3~ . 2 0 0 2 3 2 0 
11 10 9 5 9 9 9 6 8 5 11 11 
Table 8. Frequency Matnx 
Next, all the values in the f" matrix are converted to proportions by dividing each f,J 
value by f,j + ~" as shown in Table 9. Note that the diagonal entries are generated on the 
premise that for judges who did not know they were ranking an instance against itself, one 
would expect half the judges to go one way, and half the other way 
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0.' 0.27 0.27 0.64 
... 0.36 0.09 0,45 0,55 009 0.36 0 .45 06' 
0" 0.' 027 
'" 
0,55 0.09 0.36 0.73 0.82 
0.91 Q,S ; 0.27 0." 0.91 0 ,55 
0.55 036 0.27 '.6 0.45 0.73 0,18 0.36 0.36 0.62 0.18 
055 0<5 0.45 0.55 O,IL 0.55 0.18 073 
0.27 0,45 U 0.09 0.82 
0.91 0.91 082 0.91 0,' 0.91 
055 I 0.36 0,64 0.64 0,82 0.18 M 0.36 0.73 
0.82 0.64 0,36 0.64 055 0.82 0.27 0." < ,p.~ 0" 
0.01 0 .27 0.27 0.' 0.73 
0.18 0,6 \ 
0.45 0.82 0.82 {I,e> 
Table 9. ProportIOn Matnx 
Using the normality assumption, each of the proportions may be mapped into a 
standard nonnal distribution by using the inverse cumulative distribution function By 
convention, proportions greater than .98 or less than .02 arc treated as gaps in the matrix 




-0.35 o.e R· 
r--t~-r~~~-O-9-, r--,---r--~~--,--.- · . ~ 
Table 10. Z;J Matnx 
For those columns without holes a scale value for lhe MOE listed in the column 
header can be generated by the column mean. In Table 10, columns B,E,F.I and 1 are 
complete. The remaining columns may be solved as a sct of simultaneous equations of the 
form, lIJsJ - L s, == L Z q j "" 1,2, ... 11 The solutions to this set of equations will be a 
scale value for the MOE, estimating the column mean For the problem al hand, the 
following set of equations is generated 
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l l SK - SA - S,, - S0 - 5" - SI< - SL = 4,1 9441 
9SL - SA - Sc - Sa - SK = 6.67091 
9SM - Sc - 5D - Sn - 5 1< = - 5.72 169 
where S, equals the scale value for eolumn i In this instance, the resulting interval 
scale values all fall between -I and 1, and may be linearly transfonned into a more 
appropriate st;ale, In thi~ case, the linear Iransfonnation Y = SOX + 50 was used to put 
the values on a scale between 0 and 100 Scaling results are shown graphically in Figure 
70 80 90 100 
MOE R<lnk 
Figure 7, Scale Values for MOEs in First Doctrinal Bin 
'I 
Figures 8, 9, 10, and II graphically display the scaling results for the final four pages 
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